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Įdomūs pamąstymai šia tema:
First, Washington and Seoul must make every effort to avoid war in the current crisis. The United States is undoubtedly (and appropriately) quietly reinforcing U.S. forces in the region, and the CFC is understandably considering what red lines might trigger a pre-emptive conventional strike. But the fact that war with North Korea probably means nuclear war should temper any consideration of limited pre-emptive strikes. Pre-emption means war, and war means nuclear.
Second, U.S. and South Korean planners need to develop truly limited conventional military options for the Peninsula — limited not merely in their objectives but also in terms of the military operations they unleash. Perhaps the greatest danger of all is if the U.S. president and the South Korean president incorrectly believe that they have limited military options available; they and their senior advisers may not fully appreciate that those supposedly limited options in fact entail hundreds of airstrikes against high-value targets, such as leadership, command-and-control systems, and perhaps even against nuclear-weapons sites.
Third, American and South Korean leaders should urge China to develop “golden parachute” plans for the North Korean leadership and their families. Leaders in Pyongyang will keep their nuclear weapons holstered during a war only if they believe that they and their families have a safe and secure future somewhere. In the past, China has been understandably reluctant to hold official talks with the United States about facilitating the demise of its ally. But the prospect of nuclear war next door could induce Beijing to take more direct steps, including preparing an escape plan now and revealing it to Kim as soon as a first shot is fired.


Ir kokias išvadas iš to daro Iranas:
Tehran is undoubtedly drawing lessons from observing the interplay between North Korea and the West. It cannot escape notice in Tehran, for example, that despite North Korea’s catastrophic economic weakness, the regime in Pyongyang, now in possession of nuclear weapons, is viewed as a serious threat to be handled cautiously, even respectfully, by world powers fearful of triggering a nuclear confrontation. At the same time, the Iranian regime can easily discern that partly as a result of its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has become an international outcast, a place where foreign investors fear to tread, with even more devastating consequences for its crumbling economy.

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